Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Kfir Eliaz and Francoise Forges

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 126, issue C, 167-170

Abstract: We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

Keywords: Cournot duopoly; Information structure; Verifiable information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:167-170

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006

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