Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context

Michele Bernasconi, Rosella Levaggi and Francesco Menoncin ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 126, issue C, 171-175

Abstract: We study optimal dynamic compliance decisions in an uncertain environment. Contrary to the static literature, greater uncertainty affects consumption, not the optimal tax evasion rule. Thus, audit and sanctions rather than fiscal uncertainty should be used to control tax evasion.

Keywords: Optimal dynamic tax evasion; Fiscal uncertainty; Tax policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G11 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:171-175

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.013

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