Common agency with caring agents

Ilias Boultzis

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 126, issue C, 71-74

Abstract: This paper considers two extensions to the standard common agency model. First, the agent’s objective need not be increasing in contributions. Second, the agent can (partially) reject contributions from the principals. Following these extensions, I generalize the concept of truthful equilibria and their key properties.

Keywords: Common agency; Lobbying; Truthful equilibria; Contributions’ rejection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:71-74

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.006

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