Should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets?

Damian Damianov

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 126, issue C, 84-86

Abstract: In a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery–in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price–is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds. When participants are more homogeneous, it is optimal to offer discounts for the purchase of multiple tickets.

Keywords: Fundraising mechanisms; Complete information; Asymmetries; Lottery ticket discounts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:84-86

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.002

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