Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents
Yasunori Okumura ()
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 127, issue C, 14-16
In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable time.
Keywords: Entry; Aggregative games; Cournot; Constructive proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:14-16
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