One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information

Tomoya Nakamura

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 127, issue C, 27-30

Abstract: This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower’s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.

Keywords: Stackelberg competition; Cournot competition; First and second mover advantages; Public and private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:27-30

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.010

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