On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector

Ritwik Banerjee, Tushi Baul and Tanya Rosenblat

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 127, issue C, 43-46

Abstract: Do corrupt people self select themselves in professions where the scope of corruption is high? We conduct a corruption experiment with private sector job aspirants and aspirants of Indian bureaucracy. The game models embezzlement of resources in which “supervisors” evaluate the performance of “workers” and then pay them. We find that aspirant bureaucrats indulge in more corruption than private sector aspirants but the likelihood of being corrupt is same across two sectors.

Keywords: Corruption; Experiments; Bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 K42 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Working Paper: On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:43-46

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.020

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