On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector
Tushi Baul and
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 127, issue C, 43-46
Do corrupt people self select themselves in professions where the scope of corruption is high? We conduct a corruption experiment with private sector job aspirants and aspirants of Indian bureaucracy. The game models embezzlement of resources in which “supervisors” evaluate the performance of “workers” and then pay them. We find that aspirant bureaucrats indulge in more corruption than private sector aspirants but the likelihood of being corrupt is same across two sectors.
Keywords: Corruption; Experiments; Bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 O12 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:43-46
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