Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision

Pierre Boyer

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 127, issue C, 61-63

Abstract: We characterize the second-best public-goods provision rule with an inequality-averse principal. Our main results show how the provision rule reacts to variations of an exogenous budget available for public-goods provision when the principal exhibits different levels of inequality aversion.

Keywords: Public-goods provision; Comparative statics; Utilitarian welfare maximization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H41 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:61-63

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.037

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