Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 128, issue C, 79-82

Abstract: The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

Keywords: Social choice rules; Condorcet; Anonymity; Neutrality; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:128:y:2015:i:c:p:79-82

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009

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