Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk

Botao Qin and Jason Shogren

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 129, issue C, 22-24

Abstract: We add social norms into Laffont’s mechanism designed for environmental risk. We find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms, the optimal contract induces more (less) effort from the “green” (“brown”) firm.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Social norms; Environmental risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:129:y:2015:i:c:p:22-24

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.030

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