The stability of many-to-many matching with max–min preferences

Zhenhua Jiao and Guoqiang Tian

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 129, issue C, 52-56

Abstract: This paper investigates the two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where every agent has max–min preference. The equivalence between the pairwise-stability and the setwise-stability is obtained. It is shown that the pairwise-stability implies the strong corewise-stability and the former may be strictly stronger than the latter. We also show that the strong core may be a proper subset of the core. The deferred acceptance algorithm yields a pairwise-stable matching. Thus the set of stable matchings (in all four senses) is non-empty.

Keywords: Many-to-many matching; Pairwise-stability; Core; Setwise-stability; Max–min preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:129:y:2015:i:c:p:52-56

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009

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