Participation and exclusion in auctions

Harrison Cheng

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 129, issue C, 77-80

Abstract: We provide extensions of the Bulow and Klemperer (1996) result when the seller has value for the object above the minimum value of the buyers. The result may fail. We show that the seller does better with more participation and some exclusion than the optimal exclusion of buyers of low value types. Some amount of exclusion, which is independent of the number of buyers, in the form of the minimum bid is needed to make participation the dominant method for improving the seller payoff from the auctions. There exists N0, which depends on the seller valuation, such that more participation with no exclusion is dominant if and only if the number of participants exceeds N0.

Keywords: Participation; Exclusion; Payoff comparison; Single crossing property; Bulow–Klemperer Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:129:y:2015:i:c:p:77-80

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.031

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