Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions

Paul Healy () and Michael Peress

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 130, issue C, 21-23

Abstract: An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it selects the Condorcet winners–and nothing else–whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions are not monotonic (hence, not Nash implementable) when all preferences are admissible, but are implementable when restricted to a domain in which Condorcet winners always exist. We fill the gap by studying the intermediate domains and find that monotonicity is violated on all such domains.

Keywords: Condorcet winner; Nash implementation; Voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:21-23

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.028

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