On smart sanctions

Hamid Beladi and Reza Oladi

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 130, issue C, 24-27

Abstract: We construct a game theoretic model of an oligarchic economy that potentially could be targeted by smart international sanctions. Oligarchs in this economy provide support for their leader, a strong man and potentially an autocrat, in return for favors that results in having income higher than the average income in the country. We derive the conditions under which smart sanctions lead to compliance by the target country. Moreover, we draw some comparison between the effectiveness of smart and dumb sanctions for these economies.

Keywords: Smart sanctions; Economic sanctions; Oligarchic economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515000865
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:24-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.026

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().