Public offers in the market for lemons with large discounting

Kyungmin Kim

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 130, issue C, 63-65

Abstract: I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

Keywords: Bargaining with interdependent values; Public offers; The market for lemons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:63-65

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.001

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