Asymmetric information in (private) accident insurance

Martin Spindler

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 130, issue C, 85-88

Abstract: Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets has become a very important issue in the empirical literature in the last years. We analyze the (private) accident insurance, which has not been analyzed before in the literature, but covers one of the most important risks faced by individuals in modern society, namely the loss of human capital. We give descriptive statistics which are of interest in its own and show that there is asymmetric information, but the extent depends on the amount of coverage.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Accident insurance; Positive correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C14 D82 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:85-88

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.012

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