Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer
Sususmu Cato ()
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 131, issue C, 59-61
This paper is concerned with an aggregation of individual preferences. We introduce the concept of weak independent decisiveness, which is a weakening of Sen’s independent decisiveness. We show that a Paretian social welfare function satisfies weak independent decisiveness if and only if the family of weakly decisive sets forms an ultrafilter.
Keywords: Social choice; Vetoer; Weak decisiveness; Weak independent decisiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:131:y:2015:i:c:p:59-61
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