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Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer

Sususmu Cato ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 131, issue C, 59-61

Abstract: This paper is concerned with an aggregation of individual preferences. We introduce the concept of weak independent decisiveness, which is a weakening of Sen’s independent decisiveness. We show that a Paretian social welfare function satisfies weak independent decisiveness if and only if the family of weakly decisive sets forms an ultrafilter.

Keywords: Social choice; Vetoer; Weak decisiveness; Weak independent decisiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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