Self-serving bias and tax morale

Kay Blaufus, Matthias Braune, Jochen Hundsdoerfer and Martin Jacob

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 131, issue C, 91-93

Abstract: In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we find that moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade.

Keywords: Evasion; Tax morale; Tax compliance; Self-serving bias; Moral spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:131:y:2015:i:c:p:91-93

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.041

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