The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 132, issue C, 109-111

Abstract: When the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, all social choice functions satisfying resoluteness, neutrality, and anonymity (RNA rules) sometimes choose alternatives that everyone ranks near the bottom. When the number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, RNA rules only exist for a small (finite) number of values of the number of alternatives.

Keywords: Resoluteness; Neutrality; Anonymity; Perverse; Schur’s theorem; Frobenius number (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:132:y:2015:i:c:p:109-111

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026

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