Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making

Philippos Louis

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 133, issue C, 24-26

Abstract: In collective decisions with uncertainty some voters may oppose the arrival of new information. This note formalizes a justification for supermajority as a voting rule in such environments. This is optimal when arrival of information is responsive to voters’ learning aversion, and conservative minorities have some power to block information.

Keywords: Collective decisions; Public information; Learning aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:133:y:2015:i:c:p:24-26

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.012

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