Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence

Sanxi Li, Hongkun Ma and Chenhang Zeng

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 134, issue C, 37-40

Abstract: This paper builds a duopoly model to study the strategic effects of cross holding on entry deterrence. We show that, in equilibrium, the incumbent optimally chooses strictly positive cross holdings in each other to deter entry for the potential entrant.

Keywords: Cross holding; Entry deterrence; Passive ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515002463
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:134:y:2015:i:c:p:37-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.006

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().