A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu-Fu Chen and Gylfi Zoega

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 134, issue C, 98-101

Abstract: We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers’ effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

Keywords: Wages; Shirking; Finite horizons; Retirement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:134:y:2015:i:c:p:98-101

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

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