Bidding behavior in experimental auctions with positive and negative values
Ji Yong Lee and
John Fox ()
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 151-153
We test for consistency between bids from endowment auctions that allow positive or negative bids for an exchange between two items, and bids from prior full bidding auctions for the same items. Results suggest that positive WTP bids in the endowment auction are demand revealing but subjects overbid (in absolute value) their negative WTA values. WTA bids were lower in a random nth price auction than in a 5th price auction.
Keywords: Experimental auctions; Negative values; Strategic bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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