A complete characterization of hierarchy

Kui Ou-Yang

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 162-164

Abstract: When there are at least three social states, a rational social choice rule under unrestricted domain is a hierarchy if and only if it satisfies strong neutrality and strong Pareto principle, if and only if it satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, strong Pareto principle, and Pareto indifference principle.

Keywords: Social welfare function; Hierarchy; Dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:162-164

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.033

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