Robust competitive auctions

Seungjin Han

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 207-210

Abstract: A competitive distribution of auctions (Peters 1997) is robust to the possibility of a seller’s deviation to any arbitrary mechanisms, let alone direct mechanisms because the sufficient condition for the robustness is embedded in its notion of equilibrium.

Keywords: Competitive auctions; Robust equilibrium; Competing mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Robust Competitive Auctions (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:207-210

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.031

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