Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation

Matias Nuñez

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 211-213

Abstract: Under Threshold voting, voters casts ballots which include a vector of cardinal utilities (a type) and a real number (a threshold). We prove that a voter has an incentive to reveal his type: for each insincere ballot, there is a sincere ballot that the voter prefers.

Keywords: Approval voting; Strategy proofness; Cardinal utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:211-213

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.003

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