Shareholder information and partial tender offers
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 64-66
The raider faces a winners’ curse problem, when the target shareholders have private information about the post takeover value. Using Marquez and Yılmaz (2008) framework, we show that this problem can be partly mitigated by using partial tender offers.
Keywords: Partial tender offers; Winners’ curse; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D82 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:64-66
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