Shareholder information and partial tender offers

Elif Dalkır

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 64-66

Abstract: The raider faces a winners’ curse problem, when the target shareholders have private information about the post takeover value. Using Marquez and Yılmaz (2008) framework, we show that this problem can be partly mitigated by using partial tender offers.

Keywords: Partial tender offers; Winners’ curse; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D82 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515003481
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:64-66

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.08.033

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().