Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment

Alexander Saak ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 88-91

Abstract: This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Teams; Endogenous team size; Private monitoring; Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D8 L2 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515003729
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:88-91

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.014

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().