Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
Qi Liu and
Bo Sun ()
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 137, issue C, 1-4
This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation.
Keywords: Managerial compensation; Corporate hedging; Earnings management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 G38 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:137:y:2015:i:c:p:1-4
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