Higher education funding: The value of information

Limor Hatsor ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 137, issue C, 230-233

Abstract: This note examines the key role of information about individual skills in economic welfare. In the model, agents invest in higher education when the returns to their investment are uncertain. They choose how to finance their investment on the basis of a public signal about their individual skills. This note provides an example of an economic framework in which, in equilibrium, more information about individual skills (more accurate signals) makes economic agents worse off.

Keywords: Education finance; Higher education; Human capital; Information; Risk sharing; Adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Higher education funding: The value of information (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:137:y:2015:i:c:p:230-233

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.031

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