Contests, private provision of public goods and evolutionary stability

Andreas Wagener

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 138, issue C, 34-37

Abstract: We study evolutionary stability for public goods games incentivized by a contest. In a quasi-linear setting, we derive conditions such that evolutionary stability, Nash equilibrium and efficient solution coincide.

Keywords: Public goods games; Contests; Finite-player ESS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:138:y:2016:i:c:p:34-37

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.018

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