Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships

Simen Ulsaker

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 138, issue C, 72-74

Abstract: The article considers the use of menu contracts in vertical relationships. By offering publicly observable menus of contracts, competing retailers (manufacturers) can capture the entire industry profit when dealing with a common manufacturer (retailer).

Keywords: Vertical relationships; Menu contracts; Common agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515004917
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:138:y:2016:i:c:p:72-74

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.025

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().