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Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

Javier Donna, Pablo Schenone and Gregory Veramendi ()

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 138, issue C, 81-84

Abstract: We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.

Keywords: Auctions; Internet; Frictions; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Frictions in Internet Auctions with Many Traders: a Counterexample (2015) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.033

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