Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample
Pablo Schenone and
Gregory Veramendi ()
Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 138, issue C, 81-84
We show that when frictions are present, the Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS) bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a PBE of the PS game. Researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule in markets with frictions like eBay.
Keywords: Auctions; Internet; Frictions; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Frictions in Internet Auctions with Many Traders: a Counterexample (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:138:y:2016:i:c:p:81-84
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