The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data
Georgios Chortareas,
Vassilis Logothetis,
Georgios Magkonis and
Kalliopi-Maria Zekente
Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 140, issue C, 11-13
Abstract:
We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.
Keywords: Monetary policy; Banking supervision; Inflation conservatism; Panel-data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:140:y:2016:i:c:p:11-13
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021
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