EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The effect of banking supervision on central bank preferences: Evidence from panel data

Georgios Chortareas, Vassilis Logothetis, Georgios Magkonis and Kalliopi-Maria Zekente

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 140, issue C, 11-13

Abstract: We examine the effects of banking supervisory architecture on central bank preferences, quantified through a recently proposed measure of central bank conservatism. Using a dynamic panel data specification we document that central banks serving both monetary policy and banking supervision functions are less inflation conservative than those with only a price stability mandate.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Banking supervision; Inflation conservatism; Panel-data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515005388
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:140:y:2016:i:c:p:11-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.021

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2024-07-01
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:140:y:2016:i:c:p:11-13