On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers

Stefan Terstiege

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 140, issue C, 60-63

Abstract: I consider a monopolistic-pricing model in which the buyer does not know his valuation at the outset. The seller may induce him to acquire information even though she could easily disclose sufficient information herself.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Information disclosure; Pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:140:y:2016:i:c:p:60-63

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010

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