Fairness and persuasion

Marco Kleine, Pascal Langenbach and Lilia Zhurakhovska

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 141, issue C, 173-176

Abstract: We study experimentally to what extent distributive fairness decisions by impartial authorities are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness opinions. In a three-player allocation game, we compare Communication treatments, in which one of the stakeholders states her opinion prior to the allocation decision, to a Baseline without communication. We find that stakeholders who state their opinion are allocated significantly less money than their counterparts in the Baseline. Asymmetric reactions to the statements appear to be the driving force behind this result: Authorities deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow stakeholders’ opinions if the requests are moderate; they largely ignore high monetary requests.

Keywords: Fairness; Communication; Third-party decision maker; Benevolent dictator; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D83 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:173-176

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.019

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