Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits

Carsten Helm and Franz Wirl

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 141, issue C, 27-31

Abstract: This note uses the framework of Martimort and Sand-Zantmann (2013, forthcoming) about international environmental agreements. The objective is to demonstrate how a shift of private information from cost to benefit affects contracts and permit market outcomes although this seemingly ad hoc choice has no effect outside contracts and absent market interventions.

Keywords: Principal–agent; Contracts; Difference due to allocation of private information; Business as usual; Out-of-contract; Permit market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:27-31

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020

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