‘Vintage’ Nash bargaining without convexity

Eduardo Zambrano

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 141, issue C, 32-34

Abstract: I study Nash bargaining when the utility possibility set of the bargaining problem is not convex. A simple variation of Nash’s Symmetry axiom is all that is necessary to establish a set-valued version of Nash’s solution in non-convex settings.

Keywords: Non-convex bargaining problems; Nash bargaining solution; Axiomatic bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:32-34

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.009

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