The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences

Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Warut Suksompong

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 141, issue C, 44-47

Abstract: Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.

Keywords: Random dictatorship; Stochastic dominance; Pareto-efficiency; Strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:44-47

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.028

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