Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case
Mustafa Afacan and
Umutcan Salman ()
Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 141, issue C, 95-97
We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.
Keywords: Boston mechanism; Affirmative actions; Minority; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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