Norms in an asymmetric Public Good experiment

Jörg Spiller, Aneta Ufert (), Patrick Vetter and Ulrike Will ()

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 142, issue C, 35-44

Abstract: In a Public Good experiment we find that rich and poor players have different fairness considerations and that contributions are influenced but not determined by what they think is ‘right’ and by ‘what others do’ who are like them.

Keywords: Experimental economics; Public good; Asymmetric endowments; Belief elicitation; Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:142:y:2016:i:c:p:35-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.014

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