Consistent conjectures and the evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences

Ilkka Leppänen ()

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 142, issue C, 53-55

Abstract: In a model of evolution in a large but finite population, players in two-player games adopt other-regarding preferences over their opponents’ material payoffs. We show that when the players have consistent conjectures the evolutionarily stable other-regarding preference approaches the self-regarding limit, i.e. zero, as the population size increases. When players have zero conjectures, the evolutionarily stable other-regarding preference depends on the complementarity parameter that defines the contextual specification of the game.

Keywords: Other-regarding preferences; Conjectures; Evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:142:y:2016:i:c:p:53-55

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.004

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