Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
Alexander Matros and
Alex Possajennikov ()
Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 142, issue C, 74-77
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.
Keywords: Common value; Contests; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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