Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Alexander Matros and Alex Possajennikov ()

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 142, issue C, 74-77

Abstract: We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Keywords: Common value; Contests; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:142:y:2016:i:c:p:74-77

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

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