A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice

Yasunori Okumura

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 143, issue C, 111-113

Abstract: We consider a situation where a student–school matching has already been temporarily decided, but unexpectedly the quotas of some schools are increased and/or some new schools enter. Furthermore, the school priority orders are allowed to be weak. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to derive a student optimal stable matching under the profile of increased quotas that Pareto dominates the stable matching under that of initial quotas.

Keywords: Matching; Market design; School choice; Polynomial-time algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:111-113

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.006

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