A comment on ‘Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties’

Konstantinos Eleftheriou and Nickolas J. Michelacakis

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 143, issue C, 84-86

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. (2008). Specifically, we prove that in the pre-merger case, Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, whereas a vertical merger will relocate downstream firms by making them move to the right of their old socially optimal positions while keeping their in-between distance intact.

Keywords: Price discrimination; Spatial competition; Merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L42 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:84-86

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.011

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