Identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand

Caio Waisman

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 144, issue C, 1-3

Abstract: This note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand.

Keywords: Empirical auctions; Discriminatory auctions; Nonparametric identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:1-3

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.015

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