Many-to-one matchings without substitutability

Umut Dur and Devrim Ikizler

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 144, issue C, 123-126

Abstract: We study the existence of stable matchings in the many-to-one college admission problem when there are no restrictions on college preferences. We show that the existence of a stable allocation is strongly tied to students having “harmonious preferences” over their sets of acceptable college choices. In other words, without any assumption on college preferences, a stable matching exists for any college admission problem if and only if there is no subset of students with misaligned college rankings.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching; Stability; Substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651630026X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:123-126

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.005

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().