Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device

Daniel Monte

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 144, issue C, 18-21

Abstract: I analyze a repeated two-sided incomplete information game with two long-run players in which only one of them can observe the history of the game. Using standard reputation arguments, I prove that if players are sufficiently patient, then the player with no monitoring device can secure a payoff arbitrarily close to her Stackelberg payoff; providing a novel form of equilibrium selection.

Keywords: Reputation; One-sided monitoring; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:18-21

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017

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