What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation
Nadia Burani and
Arsen Palestini ()
Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 144, issue C, 29-32
We analyse the screening problem of a firm hiring workers without knowing their ability while observing their intrinsic motivation. We show that volunteerism is the contractual outcome when workers are low-skilled, have high motivation, and are protected by limited liability.
Keywords: Volunteer work; Adverse selection; Intrinsic motivation; Limited liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D82 D86 J41 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:29-32
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