Rawls’s maximin rule and Arrow’s impossibility theorem

Kui Ou-Yang

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 145, issue C, 114-116

Abstract: Rawls’s maximin rule is closely related to Arrow’s impossibility theorem. When there are at least three social states and three social members, a social welfare functional with full domain is the maximin rule if and only if it satisfies anonymity, binary independence, weak ordinal non-comparability, the weak Pareto principle, and the Pareto indifference principle.

Keywords: Social welfare functional; Rawlsianism; Arrow’s impossibility theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:114-116

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.026

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